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Introduction 
Ever since it emerged in the early 1970s the new institutional economics has been the subject of in-
tense debate.  As an important part of the new institutional economics, the modern theory of the 
firm – mainly transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory, but also agency theory 
and team theory – is no exception.1  Much of the debate on the theory of the firm has been “inter-
nal,” in the sense that it has been conducted between scholars generally sympathetic to the new in-
stitutional approach (e.g., Hart 1995; Kreps 1996; Maskin and Tirole 1999; Brousseau and Fares 
2000; Foss and Foss 2001; Furubotn 2002; McLeod 2002).  
However, there also exists a substantial, though somewhat amorphous, set of “external” cri-
tiques, arising from sociologists, heterodox economists (“old” institutionalist, Austrian, and evolu-
tionary), and management scholars, mainly in the organization and strategy fields.  Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics has been a favorite Prügelknabe for about three decades (e.g., Richard-
son 1972; Hodgson 1989; Perrow 2002), but agency theory has also drawn a fair amount of fire 
(Donaldson 1996).  For instance, early critics argued that transaction cost economics ignored the 
role of differential capabilities in structuring economic organization (Richardson 1972); neglected 
power relations (Perrow 1986), trust, and other forms of social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985); 
and overlooked evolutionary considerations, including Knightian uncertainty and market processes 
(Langlois 1984).  Such critiques have been echoed and refined in numerous contributions, and criti-
cizing the new institutional economics remains a thriving industry. The incumbents are mainly so-
ciologists (Freeland 2002; Buskens et al. 2003; Lindenberg 2003) and non-mainstream economists 
(Hodgson 1998; Loasby 1999; Witt 1999; Dosi and Marengo 2000), but new entrants are increas-
ingly recruited from the ranks of management scholars (Pfeffer 1994), particularly from the strate-
gic management field (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996; Madhok 1996).  
This chapter offers an idiosyncratic review and assessment of this critical literature.2  Our as-
sessment aims to be constructive, in that we ask if the critiques can advance the modern economic 
theory of the firm by identifying weak points, suggesting improvements, and the like.  We do not 
                                                          
1 We ignore here the claim that agency theory and property rights theory should not properly be included in the new 
institutional economics (Brousseau and Fares 2000).  
2 Some of these criticisms echo even older critiques of the neoclassical theory of the firm by Papandreou, Lester, Cyert, 
March, Simon and others.  See Foss (2000) for brief discussions of these.  
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claim to be comprehensive; unavoidably many authors, papers, and insights must be left out.  How-
ever, we aim to capture what we see as the fundamental critiques. 
We begin with a brief summary of core ideas in the modern economic theory of the firm, high-
lighting the key assumptions at which the critics have concentrated their fire.  We turn next to the 
substance of these critiques, focusing on cognitive and behavioral issues, firm heterogeneity and 
production costs, and market characteristics such as path dependence, the survivor principle, and 
other evolutionary issues.  As we consider each challenge, we discuss its implications for theoreti-
cal and applied research on the firm.  In other words, we ask what, if anything, each critique sug-
gests about how to address the three key explananda of the theory of the firm: existence, bounda-
ries, and internal organization. 
The Coasian Theory of the Firm 
Coase and Later Work on the Theory of the Firm 
The basic features of the emergence of the theory of the firm are well-known.  As the story is 
normally told, the theory of the firm traces its existence back to Coase’s landmark 1937 article, 
“The Nature of the Firm,” with its key conjecture that the main explananda of the theory of the firm 
(existence, boundaries, and internal organization) can be explained by incorporating the “costs of 
using the price mechanism” into standard economic analysis.  For various reasons, Coase’s seminal 
analysis was neglected for more than three decades; the analysis was known, but not used, as Coase 
(1972: 68) himself has noted.  However, about the same time as Coase’s lamentation, serious work 
on the theory of firm began to emerge, with four seminal contributions defining the central streams 
of research in the theory of the firm, namely transaction costs economics (Williamson 1971), the 
property rights or nexus-of-contracts approach (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), agency theory (Ross 
1973), and team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972).  
 Of these four approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the property rights ap-
proach are conventionally considered theories of the firm in the strict sense.  Neither team theory 
nor principal-agent theory explains the boundaries of the firm, de-fined in terms of asset ownership 
(Hart, 1995).  Such an explanation must presuppose that contracts are incomplete; otherwise, every-
thing can be stipulated contractually and there is no need for ownership, the “residual right” to 
make decisions under conditions not specified by contract.  Transaction cost economics and prop-
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erty rights theory, by contrast, assume that contracts are incomplete, meaning that some contingen-
cies or out-comes are not specified in the contract. Accordingly, our main emphasis will be on the 
latter two approaches. 3   
A Simple Representation 
The basic incomplete contracting argument is illustrated by the strategic-form games shown in 
Figure 1.  We choose this representation not for its own sake, but rather because it brings out many 
of the crucial underlying assumptions in the modern theory of the firm 
 
Figure 1 
                  Game 1                   Game 2 
 
  B                         B  
      left  right               left              right 
 up           2,2              0,0                up         2,2                  0,0  
A                        A 
 down      0,0              4,1                         down    0,0              4-u,1+u 
 
Following Hurwicz (1972), one can imagine economic agents choosing game forms, and the re-
sulting equilibria, for regulating their trade.  Efficiency requires that agents choose the game form 
and equilibrium that maximizes the gains from trade. The two players begin by confronting Game 
1. The problem here, of course, is that the Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique equilib-
rium, since both {up, left} and {down, right} may be equilibria on this criterion.  However, the 
{down, right} equilibrium has a higher joint surplus than the {up, left} equilibrium, so that it will 
be in A’s interest to bribe B to play {right}.  Given complete contracting, as in agency theory, u, the 
sidepayment, can be chosen (1 < u < 2) to implement the equilibrium where A plays {down} and B 
                                                          
3 For expository reasons, we generally suppress the differences between the Williamson’s and Hart’s versions of the 
incomplete-contracting story.  Brousseau and Fares (2000) analyze the differences in detail.  
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plays {right}.  However, given incomplete contracting, the side payment may not be sustainable in 
equilibrium.4  
The market failures may be remedied through contractual means; for example, A may agree to 
pay B compensation if he does not pay u, or B may agree to pay A compensation if he does not play 
{right} after receiving u.  However, such contracts may not always be feasible.  Contracts fail in the 
sense that they cannot completely safeguard against the reduction of surplus/loss of welfare stem-
ming from incentive conflicts (given risk preferences).  Given contract failure, the analytical enter-
prise is therefore one of comparing alternative contracting arrangements in terms of their implica-
tions for the joint surplus from a relation.  For example, one may compare Nash equilibria that dif-
fer in terms of the underlying distribution of bargaining strengths (for example, as given by owner-
ship patterns) (Hart 1995).  The link to observed economic organization is established by asserting 
(but not demonstrating) that what is observed is also efficient, for example, because of the existence 
of effective selection forces rapidly performing a sorting among firms with different efficiencies.   
Basic Characteristics of the Modern Theory of the Firm 
The above normal form game representation has been chosen as an illustrative device because it 
brings out a number of the crucial underlying assumptions in the modern theory of the firm.  These 
are summarized in the following. 
Cognition.  Particularly in its formal versions, the theory of the firm follows standard econom-
ics in making strong assumptions about the cognitive powers of agents.  This reflects the depend-
ence of most of the modern theory of the firm on mainstream information economics and game the-
ory.  While bounded rationality is occasionally invoked as a necessary part of the theory of the firm 
(particularly by Williamson 1985, 1996), virtually all of the contracting problems that are studied in 
the modern theory of the firm can be approached making use of the more tractable notion of asym-
metric information (Hart 1990). Relatedly, because of the Bayesian underpinning of game theoreti-
cal contract theory, “Knightian,” “deep,” “radical,” etc. uncertainty has no role to play.  In the 
above representation, players can thus never be surprised.   
Given alternatives. Because of the strong assumptions that are made with respect to agents’ 
cognitive powers, decision situations are always unambiguous and “given.” The choice of efficient 
                                                          
4 For example, if A gives B the bribe before the game begins, B will not play {right}, which means that A will decide 
not to give B any bribe.  Or, A may promise B to pay the bribe after game, but B will realize that this will not be in A’s 
interest, and will still play {left}.   
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economic organization is portrayed as a standard maximization problem in the case of contract de-
sign or as a choice between given “discrete, structural alternatives” (Williamson 1996) in the case 
of the choice of governance structures.  There is no learning, no need for entrepreneurial discovery 
and no explicit room is made for the innovation of new contractual or organizational forms.  In the 
above representation, strategies are thus given.  
Motivation.  Motivation is assumed to be wholly extrinsic (Frey 1997).  Hence, stronger mone-
tary incentives always call forth more effort (in a least one dimension).   To the extent that low 
powered incentives are called for, this is solely explained in terms of the multi-tasking agency prob-
lem (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).  
Explaining economic organization. Problems of economic organization may in generic terms 
be represented as games where the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal.  While this formally in-
cludes, for example, coordination games of the stag-hunt variety (Camerer and Knez 1996), the 
modern theory of the firm generally ignores many kinds of coordination problems, focusing instead 
on incentive alignment. The function of contracts, governance structures, and mechanisms such as 
reputation is to give agents the incentives to choose Pareto superior equilibria.  Ultimately, the 
causes of inefficiency as well impediments to reaching first-best outcomes are transaction costs. 
Production costs play no direct role in the explanation.  
Methodological individualism.  Aggregates play no independent role in explanation in the sense 
of being causal agents. The aim is to explain contractual and organizational forms in terms of indi-
vidual actions.  Thus, aggregate level constructs such as “trust,” “embeddedness,” “organizational 
cognition,” “capabilities,” etc. are not part of the explanans of the modern theory of the firm, and 
are only seldom treated as explanandum phenomena (but see, e.g., Kreps 1990 on culture).   
Mode of explanation.  As a first approximation, efficient economic organization is supposed to 
be consciously chosen by well-informed, rational agents. If pressed on the issue, economists of or-
ganization may also invoke evolutionary processes that are assumed to perform a sorting between 
organizational forms in favor of the efficient ones (Williamson 1985).  Thus, explanation is either 
fully “intentional” or “functional-evolutionary” (Elster 1983; Dow 1987).   
What Are the Critics Criticizing?  
Most of the above characteristics are not particular to the theory of the firm.  They are generally 
made in game-theoretical microeconomics.  Thus, critics of the theory of the firm may appear to be 
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really criticizing modern microeconomic.  However, while this may indeed be the case for some 
critics, a different interpretation is possible: What the critics protest is the use of analytical tools that 
may well be appropriate for the analysis of market exchange to analyze firm organization.  While 
some economists maintain that there is no difference in kind between firms and markets (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972; Cheung 1983), and most economists would agree that the same analytical tools 
are applicable to firms as well as to markets, it is a strong underlying theme among the critics that 
firms are essentially different from markets and many of the critics (particularly sociologists) argue 
that they need to be approached using different tools (Freeland 2002).   
Thus, while some critics may balk at methodological individualism and assumptions of full, in-
strumental rationality in general, they are likely to find such assumptions particularly objectionable 
when they are applied to the theory of the firm.  Thus, in the literature that is critical of the modern 
theory of the firm, firms are often portrayed in rosy terms as “mini-societies” (Freeland 2002) that 
provide “identity” (Kogut and Zander 1996), “higher-order organizing principles” (Kogut and 
Zander 1992), trust relations (Ghoshal and Moran 1996), and collective learning (Hodgson 1998) 
that, purportedly, “atomistic” markets cannot provide. Firms exist because and to the extent that 
they can supply “identity,” “collective learning,” etc.   
While we are highly skeptical of such arguments, we acknowledge that they may point to unre-
solved issues and weak spots in the modern theory of the firm.  For example, one can deny meth-
odological collectivism and still hold that there are firm-specific cultures and capabilities, the un-
derstanding of which is inadequate in the modern theory of the firm (in spite of the efforts of, e.g., 
Kreps 1990).  Or, one can argue that there is too little room for bounded rationality in this body of 
theory. In the following sections, we discuss and assess a number of such critiques of the modern 
theory of the firm in greater detail.  
 
Cognitive and Motivational Issues 
Bounded Rationality  
Formal, mainstream economics typically assumes that agents hold the same, correct model of 
the world and that model does not change.  The theory of the firm is no exception.  More precisely, 
these assumptions are built into formal contract theory through the assumption that payoffs, strate-
gies, and the like are common knowledge.  These assumptions are clearly at variance with the no-
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tion of bounded rationality (Simon 1955).  Indeed, the game-theoretic models used in most theoreti-
cal research on the theory of the firm ignore bounded rationality altogether, although it may play a 
role in the “rhetorical” motivation of such research (see Foss 2003). 
In contrast, bounded rationality is often invoked in Oliver Williamson’s (1985, 1996) less for-
mal work.  “But for bounded rationality,” he argues (1996: 36), “all issues of organization collapse 
in favor of comprehensive contracting of either Arrow-Debreu or mechanism design kinds.”  What 
Williamson calls “comprehensive contracting” does not allow for “governance structures” in the 
sense of mechanisms that handle the coordination and incentive problems produced by unantici-
pated change (Williamson 1996: chapter 4).  However, the role of bounded rationality in William-
son’s work is mainly to provide a reason why contracts are incomplete.5  It is a sort of background 
assumption that while necessary, never really assumes a central role.  Indeed, many critics have ob-
served that to the extent that bounded rationality enters the theory of the firm, it is in rather “thin” 
forms (e.g., Macleod 2000; Foss 2003).  The reason is presumably that the theory is taken up with 
comparative institutional exercises, focusing on transaction cost economizing, and hence has no 
room for the process aspects introduced by more substantive notions of bounded rationality (e.g., 
Furubotn 2002).    
Still, even the rather limited use of bounded rationality in the theory of the firm has been criti-
cized.  Hart (1990) argues that bounded rationality may not be necessary at all, because asymmetric 
information (in the form of imperfect verifiability) can do the job that bounded rationality is sup-
posed to do, and can do so more elegantly and more consistently with mainstream modeling (see 
also Posner, 1993). From a different position, Dow (1987) argues that it is inconsistent to invoke 
bounded rationality as a necessary assumption in the analysis of contracts and governance struc-
tures, and then assume that substantively rational choices can be made with respect to the contracts 
and governance structures (that are imperfect because of bounded rationality).  This point is echoed 
in Kreps’s (1996) critique of contract theory.  Contract theory assumes that although the parties to a 
contract cannot describe the benefits from an exchange relationship, they can perfectly anticipate 
the benefits produced by the different contractual arrangements that can structure such a relation-
                                                          
5 Therefore, Williamson’s treatment of bounded rationality seldom goes beyond quoting Simon’s dictum that man is 
“intendedly rational, but limitedly so.”  He notes that “[e]conomizing on bounded rationality takes two forms.  One 
concerns decision processes and the other involves governance structures.  The use of heuristic problem-solving . . . is a 
decision process response” (Williamson 1985: 46). The latter “form” is not central, however, in transaction cost eco-
nomics, which “is principally concerned . . . with the economizing consequences of assigning transactions to govern-
ance structures in a discriminating way.”   
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ship.  Of course, this assumption is made to rationalize the ex ante choice of ownership or incentive 
structures.  While it may make formal sense (cf. Maskin and Tirole 1999), “not everything that is 
logically consistent is credulous,” as Kreps (1996: 565) laconically observes in a comment on 
Maskin and Tirole.  He argues that the Maskin and Tirole argument (and virtually all of contract 
theory) simply takes rationality too far, and that more attention should be paid to bounded rational-
ity.6 
In contrast, bounded rationality has long been a central assumption in organization theory (e.g., 
March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963).  In fact, recent critics of the theory of the firm 
have drawn explicitly on these older sources to develop alternative, evolutionary views emphasizing 
the role of bounded rationality in problem-solving, and the role of firms as cognitive structures 
around such problem-solving efforts (e.g., Dosi and Marengo 1994).  Other critics, also echoing be-
haviorist organization theory, argue that a key characteristic of firms is that they tend to shape em-
ployee cognition (Kogut and Zander 1996; Hodgson 1998; Witt 1999). For example, starting with 
social learning theory, Witt (1999) argues that individual cognitive frames are socially shaped and 
that firms can accomplish such shaping.  In particular, entrepreneurs form business conceptions that 
underlie their “cognitive leadership,” making employees internalize and collectively share the cog-
nitive categories embodied in the business conception.  
Motivation 
While the role of bounded rationality in the theory of the firm has given rise to a fair amount of 
debate, it is nothing compared to the enormous amount of critical writings on the motivational as-
sumptions in the theory.  In particular, opportunism seems to be the favorite bête-noire.  The cri-
tique of opportunism takes various forms.  Empirically, the relevance of opportunism is dismissed 
by pointing to the low frequency with which opportunistic action can be observed, for example, in 
industrial networks or in long-term associations between firms and their suppliers (see, e.g., 
Håkansson and Snehota 1990).  The obvious problem with such arguments is that they are based on 
a misunderstanding of the counterfactual nature of reasoning in the theory of the firm:  Opportunis-
tic behavior is seldom observed because governance structures are chosen to mitigate opportunism.  
                                                          
6 A perhaps deeper problem stems from trying to combine substantive rationality with respect to some variables with 
rationality about other variables that is very bounded indeed.  This is problematic, because in reality knowledge of the 
former variables (the expected surplus from the relation) is likely to be dependent upon knowledge of the latter vari-
ables (the sources of the surplus).  
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Another argument asserts that opportunism is not a necessary assumption in the theory of the firm 
(e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992), but this line of reasoning fails to provide convincing alternative ac-
counts.  
According to a more recent and more sophisticated set of arguments, the primary problem with 
the treatment of motivation in the theory of the firm is not opportunism per se, but rather that mod-
ern economic approaches assume that all motivation is of the “extrinsic” type (Ghoshal and Moran 
1996; Osterloh and Frey 2000).  In other words, all behavior is understood in terms of encourage-
ment from an external force, such as the expectance of a monetary reward.  (In contrast, when “in-
trinsically” motivated, individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake).  These arguments do 
not necessarily deny the reality of opportunism, moral hazard, and so on, but assert that there are 
other, more appropriate ways to handle these problems than providing monetary incentives, sanc-
tions, and monitoring.  The arguments are often based on social psychological research (notably 
Deci and Ryan 1985) and on experimental economics (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000).   
In one version of the argument, Pfeffer (1994) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that the 
theory of the firm misconstrues the causal relation between motivation (e.g., the tendency to shirk) 
and the surrounding environment (the type of governance structure in place). For example, Ghoshal 
and Moran (1996: 21) claim that individuals within an organization perform not according to the 
incentives and opportunities offered, but to their “feelings for the entity.”  “Hierarchical” controls, 
they state, reduce organizational loyalty and thus increase shirking. Reliance on internal governance 
in the presence of relationship-specific investments, they hold, causes the very problems it is de-
signed to alleviate: Williamson’s approach becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” and is therefore 
“bad for practice.”7  In another version of the argument Osterloh and Frey (2000) ask which organ-
izational forms are conducive to knowledge creation and transfer.  They note that elements of mar-
ket control (e.g., high-powered incentives) are often introduced in firms to accomplish this.  How-
ever, Osterloh and Frey argue that this only works to the extent that there is no “motivation crowd-
ing-out effect,” in which extrinsic motivation does not crowd out intrinsic motivation.  They draw 
on Deci and Ryan (1985) and other contributions to social psychology to argue that motivation may 
                                                          
7 However, while Ghoshal and Moran question the substantial empirical literature supporting Williamson’s theory, they 
offer little systematic evidence for their own view. They simply assert that the strong empirical relationship between 
specific assets and vertical integration exists because these assets reduce the cost of internal organization, independent 
of their effects on the hazards of market governance. They cite Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991), who have shown 
that this is a possibility with respect to specific human capital. However, there is no evidence that specific physical as-
sets reduce the costs of internal organization, nor do Ghoshal and Moran supply a coherent theory for such an effect.   
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be harmed when agents perceive that their actions are subject to external control (as with a per-
formance-pay system).  Osterloh and Frey argue that forms of internal organization that foster in-
trinsic motivation can more successfully create and transfer tacit knowledge because such activities 
cannot be compelled, only enabled.   
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
Few economists of organization have reacted to the above critiques. We suspect this is partly 
because taking these critiques seriously means questioning fundamental tenets of mainstream eco-
nomic modeling.  For example, taking bounded rationality seriously opens up a Pandora’s box be-
cause bounded rationality challenges the game-theoretic foundations underlying the formal litera-
ture on the theory of the firm  (i.e., subjective expected utility theory, the independence of payoff 
utilities, the irrelevance of labeling, and common prior beliefs (Camerer 1998)).  Organizational 
economists may also question what bounded rationality adds to the theory (Hart 1990).  Williamson 
(1998: 12) notes that “organization can and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing vary-
ing cognitive and behavioral propensities to best advantage,” and that the many ramifications of 
bounded rationality should be explored to help identify those regularities in decision-making that 
differ from the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage model.  The implications of these regu-
larities for efficient organization can then be developed and incorporated into the theory of the firm 
(Williamson 1998: 18). However, Williamson (1998) mainly emphasizes that the findings of cogni-
tive psychology are consistent with “[t]he transaction cost economics triple for describing human 
actors—bounded rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportunism.” Moreover, many bounds on 
rationality are substantially mitigated by organization, because organization has recourse to spe-
cialization, which allows for economizing with cognitive effort.  Such arguments cast doubt on the 
belief that taking bounded rationality more seriously will yield theoretical advances.   
However, a handful of contributions, mainly to contract theory, do try to model agents that are 
boundedly rational in a more substantive sense.  For example, Mookerjee (1998) shows how ambi-
guity may lead to incomplete contracting; Carmichael and McLeod (2003) show that if boundedly-
rational agents care about sunk costs, this may solve the hold-up problem.  There are various prob-
lems with such approaches.  Notably, there may be too many “degrees of freedom,” in the sense 
that virtually any cognitive bias may be thrown into a standard contracting model, thus producing a 
nonstandard result.  Moreover, how does the theorist decide which manifestation of bounded ration-
 11  
 
ality to model?  The danger is that one ends up with a string of unconnected and extreme partial 
models with no apparent connection to empirical reality.  
In our opinion, working with alternative motivational assumptions may be a more fruitful way 
forward.  It is easier to doctor utility functions than cognitive assumptions.  There is established so-
cial psychology work, the insights of which may be fed relatively directly into modeling efforts 
(and see Benabou and Tirole 2002).  Moreover, the implications for economic organization may 
also seem more immediate (see Lazear 1991 and Fehr and Gächter 2000 for concrete examples).   
 
Firm Heterogeneity, Capabilities, and Production Costs 
The Knowledge-Based View 
A growing number of writers within heterodox economics (particularly evolutionary econom-
ics) and strategic management now embrace “capabilities,” “dynamic capabilities,” or “compe-
tence” approaches (e.g., Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Kogut and Zander 1992; 
Foss 1993; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Loasby 1999; Teece and Pisano 1994; Winter 1991).  We here 
lump all these together under the heading “knowledge-based view of the firm.”  Contributions to 
the knowledge-based view are usually launched on a background of critique of new institutional 
economics, particularly Williamson’s version of TCE.  The critique concerns the reliance on oppor-
tunism and the neglect of differential capabilities (i.e., firm heterogeneity) and dynamics (e.g., Win-
ter 1991; Langlois 1992; Kogut and Zander 1992).   
In contrast, contributors to the knowledge-based view typically begin from the empirical gener-
alization that firm-specific knowledge is sticky and tacit and develops through path-dependent 
processes. This implies that organizations are necessarily limited in what they know how to do 
well.8  Differential capabilities imply differences in terms of the efficiency with which resources are 
deployed.  Superior capabilities imply the capacity to earn long-lived rents that. Beginning perhaps 
with Kogut and Zander (1992) and Langlois (1992), adherents of the knowledge-based view have 
also argued that the characteristics of capabilities that make them relevant the study of competitive 
advantage are also crucial for the study of the main issues in economic organization. Thus, knowl-
                                                          
8 Large parts of the knowledge-based view implicitly and sometimes explicitly subscribe to methodological collectivism 
(e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Hodgson 1998).   
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edge-based writers argue that a theory of the firm, derived from knowledge-based considerations 
rather than from incentives, opportunism, and transaction costs, is in prospect.  
The Knowledge-Based View as a Theory of Economic Organization 
The idea that a knowledge-based view may have implications for economic organization is not 
quite new.  George B. Richardson (1972) suggested that we begin, not from the Coasian idea of 
transaction costs, but from the idea that production can be broken down into various activities that 
are underpinned by firm-specific capabilities.  Some activities are similar, in that they draw on the 
same general capabilities, and activities can also be complementary in that they are connected in 
the chain of production, and similarity and complementarity may obtain to varying degrees.  The 
main point in Richardson (1972) is that the boundaries of the firm are strongly influenced by these 
dimensions of activities.9 However, it is unclear in Richardson’s paper exactly how capabilities 
are supposed to influence economic organization.    
Some papers (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Langlois 1992) argue that differential capabilities 
give rise to different production costs, and that such cost differentials may crucially influence the 
make or buy decision. Thus, firms may internalize activities because they can carry out these 
activities in a more production (not transaction) cost-efficient way than other firms are capable of.  
The factors that make capabilities distinctive and costly to imitate, for example, complexity and 
tacitness, also mean that such differences in production costs may be long-lived.  Thus, agents of 
one firm may quite literally not understand what another firm wants from them (for example, in 
supplier contracts) or is offering them (for example, in license contracts).  The costs of making 
contacts with potential partners, of educating potential licensees and franchisees, of teaching 
suppliers what it is one needs from them, etc., -- what Langlois (1992) christens “dynamic transaction 
costs” to distinguish them from the transaction costs usually considered in the theory of the firm – 
may influence where the boundaries of the firm are placed.   
Knowledge-based writers also claim that the existence of the firm can be explained in knowl-
edge-based terms and without making use of the assumption of opportunism (Hodgson 2004). Thus, 
Demsetz (1988) argues that firms exist for reasons of economizing on expenditures on communicat-
ing and coordinating knowledge. Thus, the employment contract, and hierarchy more generally, 
                                                          
9 For example, closely complementary and similar activities are best undertaken under unified governance, whereas 
closely complementary but dis-similar activities are normally best undertaken under some sort of hybrid arrangement 
(to use Williamson’s (1996) terminology). 
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may exist because it is efficient to have the less knowledgeable being directed by the more knowl-
edgeable. A very different argument is forwarded by Kogut and Zander (1992) who argue that firms 
exist because they can create certain assets—such as learning capabilities or a “shared context”—that 
markets purportedly cannot create:  
organizations are social communities in which individual and social expertise is trans-
formed into economically useful products and services by the application of a set of 
higher-order organizing principles.  Firms exist because they provide a social community 
of voluntaristic action structured by organizing principles that are not reducible to indi-
viduals (Kogut and Zander 1992: 384), 
a view, they claim, that  “differs radically from that of the firm as a bundle of contracts that serves to 
allocate efficiently property rights” (ibid.).  Firms’ advantages over markets derive from their being 
able to supply “organizing principles that are not reducible to individuals.”  
The problem with this argument is that it does sufficiently characterize firms: Markets can cultivate 
learning capabilities and shared context (as in industrial districts), as well.  Moreover, embeddedness 
of the kind that Kogut and Zander talk about does not require firm organization: in a moral utopia, 
characterized by the absence of opportunistic proclivities, the gains from embeddedness could be real-
ized over the market.  Agents could simply meet under the same factory roof, own their own pieces of 
physical capital equipment or rent it to each other, and develop value-enhancing “organizing princi-
ples” (to use Kogut and Zander’s term) among themselves, or in other ways integrate their specialized 
knowledge (as a team). Firms would not be necessary.10   
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
While we are skeptical of the specific knowledge-based explanations for economic organiza-
tion, we acknowledge that the view does point to some weak points in the theory of the firm.11  For 
example, differential capabilities probably do play a role in determining the boundaries of the firm 
                                                          
10 Moreover, even in an opportunism-prone world, there may be much embeddedness “outside” firms, as it were, for 
example, in single industries, in firm networks, industrial districts, etc., depending on the presence of various control 
and enforcement mechanisms.  
11 In a recent paper, two leading theorists of the firm, Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998: 90) observed that 
“[I]nformation and knowledge are at the heart of organizational design, because they result in contractual and incentive 
problems that challenge both markets and firms. . . . In light of this, it surprising that leading economic theories . . . 
have paid almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.” Similarly, Coase (1988: 47) has lamented that in 
his 1937 paper, he “did not investigate the factors that would make the costs of organizing lower for some firms than for 
others.”   
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(Walker and Weber 1984; Monteverde 1995; Argyes 1996).  However, there are two major prob-
lems in this area that may hinder progress.  The first is that the nature of the central construct (i.e., 
capabilities) itself is highly unclear.  It is not clear how capabilities are conceptualized, dimension-
alized, and measured, and it is not clear how capabilities emerge and are changed by individual ac-
tion (Felin and Foss 2004).  The second problem partly follows from the first: the mechanisms be-
tween capabilities and economic organization are unclear (Heimann and Nickerson 2002; Foss 
2005).  
One of the few attempts to provide such a mechanism is Langlois (1992), who gives a key role 
to dynamic transaction costs.  In other words, economizing with costs of communication (i.e., dy-
namic transaction costs) is a possible determinant of the boundaries of the firm (and see Monte-
verde 1995 for this).  More generally, the genuine challenges that the knowledge-based view repre-
sents has more probably more to do with the non-standard transaction problems relating to the ex-
change of knowledge than with the fuzzy notion of “firm capability.”  In other words, exchanging 
knowledge may lead to contractual frictions and hazards that do not involve opportunism and it may 
involve transaction costs that have nothing to do with misaligned incentives and everything to do 
with costly communication.   
Entrepreneurship 
A major problem with modern economic theories of the firm is that they ignore the entrepreneur 
(Furubotn 2002; Foss and Klein 2004).  Thus, Furubotn (2002: 72-3) points out that “profit is always in 
the background of TCE analysis because it is impossible to say whether a particular action (and con-
tractual arrangement) undertaken by the firm is desirable or not purely on the basis of the costs of 
transacting. . . . There is reason, then, to give greater consideration to the question of how profits are 
generated.” And this leads to the theory of entrepreneurship.  However, in the modern theory of the 
firm reference to entrepreneurship is passing at best.  These approaches are largely static and “closed,” 
meaning that they focus on solutions to given optimization problems.12 
                                                          
12 Agency theory, for example, has generated important insights on the effects of incentives on effort and the relationship 
between incentive pay and risk.  In explaining how a principal gets an agent to do something, however, the theory overlooks 
the more fundamental question of what the principal should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got to be a 
principal in the first place. 
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Concepts of Entrepreneurship  
Probably the best-known concept of entrepreneurship in economics is Schumpeter’s (1934) idea of 
the entrepreneur as innovator, who introduces “new combinations” — new products, production meth-
ods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — shaking the economy out of its previous 
equilibrium. Entrepreneurship can also be conceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. While pre-
sent in older notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most fully by Kirzner 
(1973). Kirzner’s formulation emphasizes the nature of competition as a discovery process: the source 
of entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight—the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving 
technology) un-known to other market participants.  Success, in this view, comes not from following a 
well-specified maximization problem, but from having some knowledge or insight that no one else has.  
None of these accounts, however, links entrepreneurship closely to the theory of the firm. Small-
business management is only one manifestation of entrepreneurship. Creativity, innovation, and alert-
ness are undoubtedly important, but neither activity must take place within a firm.  Charismatic leaders 
work with teams, but need not own physical assets, around which the boundaries of the firm are drawn.  
Putting Entrepreneurship Into the Theory of the Firm 
Various attempts to put entrepreneurship into the theory of the firm exist (e.g., Langlois and 
Robertson 1995; Casson 1997).  An attempt that stays relatively close to the new institutional theory of 
the firm is Foss and Klein (2004).  They outline an alternative account of entrepreneurship as judg-
mental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.  Judgment refers primarily to business deci-
sion-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual out-
comes, is generally un-known (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic 
risk).  The concept of entrepreneurship as judgment has a direct and natural link to the theory of the 
firm. Because markets for judgment are closed, the exercise of judgment requires starting a firm; 
moreover, judgment implies asset ownership.  In this approach, resource uses are not data, but are cre-
ated as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods.  The entrepreneur’s deci-
sion problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not immediately 
obvious how they should be combined. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting entrepreneurship: 
acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carrying out commercial experimentation.  
Moreover, important features of internal organization such as delegation and contractual incomplete-
ness can be understood in terms of employers’ attempts to facilitate “productive” entrepreneurship 
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while discouraging non-productive forms of decision-making.  In short, firm boundaries and internal 
organization may be understood as responses to entrepreneurial processes of experimentation.   
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
Will these insights be incorporated into the economic theory of the firm?  Because these con-
cepts lie fundamentally outside the standard constrained optimization framework, they are inher-
ently difficult to model mathematically.  Modern economists have difficulty appreciating ideas that 
are not expressed in this familiar language.  Indeed, most recent theoretical advances in the eco-
nomic theory of the firm have been developed within the more formal framework associated with 
Grossman, Hart, and Moore, not the more “open” framework associated with Williamson.13  Relax-
ing this constraint may lead to considerable advances in economists’ understanding of the firm.  
Process Issues 
Path Dependence 
The claim that the theory of the firm, because of its emphasis on efficiency at a point of time 
and on cross-sectional variation, is ahistorical and neglects process has often been made by econo-
mists and management scholars within both the knowledge-based and the evolutionary perspective.  
Thus, according to Winter (1991: 192): 
In the evolutionary view—perhaps in contrast to the transaction cost view—the size of a 
large firm at a particular time is not to be understood as the solution to some organiza-
tional problem.  General Motors does not sit atop the Fortune 500 … because some set 
of contemporary cost minimization imperatives (technological or organizational) require 
a certain chunk of the U.S. economy to be organized in this manner.  Its position at the 
top reflects the cumulative effect of a long string of happenings stretching back into the 
past.” 
One way to interpret this critique is that the theory of the firm seeks to explain the governance 
of individual transactions (Williamson 1996), or clusters of attributes (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom,1994), without identifying how the governance of a particular transaction may depend on how 
previous transactions were governed. Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) term this historical depend-
ency “governance inseparability.” Where governance inseparability is present, firms may rely on 
governance structures that appear inefficient at a particular time, but which make sense as part of a 
                                                          
13 Bajeri and Tadelis (2001) is a prominent exception.   
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longer-term process.  Changes in governance structure affect not only the transaction in question, 
but the entire temporal sequence of transactions. This may make organizational form appear more 
“sticky” than it really is. 
This criticism will sound familiar to Austrian and evolutionary economists, who have long ar-
gued for a “process” view of economic activity that takes time seriously (Hayek 1948 Kirzner 1973; 
Dosi 2000).  Hayek (1948) distinguished between the neoclassical economics notion of “competi-
tion,” identified as a set of equilibrium conditions (number of market participants, characteristics of 
the product, and so on), and the older notion of competition as a rivalrous process. Practices that 
appear inefficient or even anticompetitive at a given moment are better understood as part a process 
of competition through time; it is the process that should be evaluated in welfare terms, not the con-
ditions that obtain at a particular moment in the process  
Williamson (1996), recognizing the need to incorporate history into transaction cost economics, 
has introduced the notion of remediableness as a welfare criterion. The outcome of a path-
dependent process is suboptimal, he argues, only if it is remediable—that is, an alternative outcome 
can be implemented with net gains. Merely pointing to a hypothetical superior outcome, if it not 
attainable, does not establish suboptimality.  Thus, a governance structure or contractual arrange-
ment “for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected 
net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson 1996: 7) (for a critique, see Furubotn 2002: 89-
90). 
Selection and Survival: Are all Organizations “Efficient”? 
The explanation of economic organization in terms of efficiency has been one of the most fre-
quently criticized characteristics of the theory of the firm: Assuming that agents can figure out the 
efficient organizational arrangements seems to collide with the assumption of bounded rationality 
(Dow 1987; Furubotn 2002).  Presumably in response to this problem, early work in the theory of 
the firm often explicitly assumed that market forces work to cause an “efficient sort” between trans-
actions and governance structures, an assumption that is not in general tenable.  
While appealing to market selection, Williamson (1988: 174) also clearly recognizes that the 
process of transaction cost economizing is not automatic.  Still, he maintains that the efficiency pre-
sumption is reasonable, offering the argument that inefficient governance arrangements will tend to 
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be discovered and undone.14 Clearly, this assumption is not an innocuous one.  It is in fact a key un-
derlying assumption in virtually all empirical work in the theory of the firm.  A general problem 
with the empirical literature on organizational form is that we usually observe only the business ar-
rangements actually chosen.  However, if these arrangements are presumed to be efficient, then we 
can draw inferences about the appropriate alignment between transactional characteristics and or-
ganizational form simply by observing what firms do.   The problem is that the efficiency assump-
tion has always been taken as an essential, but untested, background assumption.  
In one of the few attempts to grapple empirically with the efficiency assumption, Lien and Klein 
(2004) examine the assumption that decisions or behaviors that occur frequently in a population of 
competitive firms are on average more efficient than those that occur rarely. They conduct the test 
in the context of corporate diversification.  If the survivor principle holds, those pairs of industries 
most frequently combined within firms (“related” businesses) should tend to represent more effi-
cient combinations than those pairs that are rarely combined. As firms strive to improve their per-
formance, they tend to exit “unrelated” industries, that is, industries that are poor matches for their 
other businesses. Using detailed data on firms’ business portfolios from the AGSM/Trinet database 
for the early 1980s, Lien and Klein (2004) show that the survivor-based measure of relatedness is a 
strong predictor of exit, even when controlling for other firm and industry characteristics that might 
affect the decision to withdraw from a particular industry. During that period, then, the competitive 
selection process did tend to filter out inappropriate business combinations.15  
Another approach is to see if “appropriately” organized firms—that is, firms organized along 
the lines recommended by the theory of the firm—outperform the feasible alternatives. Several pa-
pers in the empirical TCE literature use a two-step procedure in which organizational form (in par-
ticular, the relationship between transactional characteristics and governance structure) is endoge-
nously chosen in the first stage, then used to explain performance in the second stage. By endoge-
                                                          
14 Concerning vertical integration, for example, Williamson (1985: 119-20) writes that “backward integration that lacks 
a transaction cost rationale or serves no strategic purposes will presumably be recognized and will be undone,” adding 
that mistakes will be corrected more quickly “if the firm is confronted with an active rivalry.” 
15 However, the early 1980s was a period of corporate refocus and de-conglomeration (Bhide 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 
1991) and exit decisions during this period may reflect fashion and herd behavior, not efficiency.  Moreover, though the 
findings support using the efficiency assumption in research on diversification, it may not hold for other decisions, such 
as the choice between market and hierarchical governance. 
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nizing both organizational form and performance this approach also mitigates the selection bias as-
sociated with OLS regressions of performance on firm characteristics.16  
These evolutionary approaches shed considerable light on the processes by which organizations 
adapt and change, along with the costs of misalignment or maladaptation. However, reliance on 
evolutionary models introduces additional problems. In many cases, survival may not be the best 
measure of performance, compared with profitability or market value. Poorly performing firms may 
survive due to inefficient competitors, regulatory protection, or legal barriers to exit such antitake-
over amendments or an overprotective bankruptcy code. In short, efficient alignment between 
transactions and governance should be expected only if the selection environment is strong. More-
over, when market conditions change rapidly and unexpectedly, ex post survival may not be a good 
measure of ex ante efficiency; a particular organizational form may be right for the times, but the 
times change. Indeed, the optimal organizational forms may be those that adapt most readily to new 
circumstances (Boger, Hobbs, and Kerr 2001).  
Conclusion 
Almost two decades ago Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1988: 450) argued that the “incen-
tive-based transaction costs theory has been made to carry too much of the weight of explanation in 
the theory of organizations,” and predicted that “competing and complementary theories” would 
emerge, “theories that are founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more atten-
tion to changing technology and to evolutionary considerations.”  However, despite the importance 
in the management literature of knowledge-based or capabilities theories of the firm, this body of 
thought cannot yet be considered a serious competitor to the “incentive-based transaction costs the-
ory.”  No other serious competitors have emerged.  
One possible reason is that the conventional theory of the firm is sufficiently successful, theo-
retically and empirically, that competitors have a hard time gaining a foothold.  Still, as we have 
stressed throughout this chapter, many of the critiques do in fact point to weaknesses in the theory 
of the firm that should ideally be remedied.  A further reason is that the critics tend to focus on phe-
nomena that are difficult to model, phenomena that are not readily “tractable” in the sense familiar 
                                                          
16 Some representative papers using a two-stage approach (such as Heckman’s selection model) in this fashion are Mas-
ten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991) and Saussier (2000). 
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to mainstream economists.  Innovation, entrepreneurship, bounded rationality, learning, evolution-
ary processes, and differential capabilities are examples of such phenomena.  We should not expect 
to see these phenomena integrated into the mainstream economic theory of the firm until the formal 
tools that can handle them have been developed.  Moreover, the empirical literature supporting the 
challenges outlined above tends to be idiosyncratic, based on experimental or qualitative work 
rather than the standard econometric analysis familiar to economists.  Finally, the various critiques 
are not separate but overlapping or complementary.  For example, the claim that the theory of the 
firm neglects bounded rationality is very close to the claim that it ignores differential capabilities, 
learning, and path dependence.  In turn, the complaint that the theory of the firm neglects the latter 
phenomena is closely related to concerns that it assumes, uncritically, that selection forces operate 
to produce efficiency.  In other words, the critiques come in a package, so that embracing one cri-
tique may be taken as embracing the rest — which would mean abandoning the theory of the firm 
as we know it.   
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